Possible Iraq-for-Georgia Deal Could Seal Baghdad's Fate
Stratfor, 13 September 2002
Summary
Washington and Moscow appear to be discussing a possible deal in
which Russia would not veto a U.S. attack on Iraq in the U.N.
Security Council in exchange for Washington's tacit agreement on a
Russian counterterrorist operation in Georgia. If the deal holds,
Iraq's fate will be soon sealed, but the consequences could hurt
Russia as well in the end.
Analysis
Russian President Vladimir Putin threatened Sept. 11 to send troops
into Georgia's Pankisi Gorge unless Tbilisi deals with Islamic
militants -- including alleged Chechen rebels -- within its borders,
the BBC reports. On Sept. 12 Putin also warned the United Nations
that Russia would take "necessary measures" to defend itself against
cross-border Islamist attacks if Tbilisi cannot control the gorge.
The Bush administration, which until just a few days ago publicly
supported Georgia against such Russian threats, recently said through
statements by U.S. Ambassador Alexander Vershbow that al Qaeda agents
are operating not only in the Pankisi but also in Chechnya. Vershbow
also met with Russian officials Sept. 12 for talks on anti-terrorism
cooperation and Iraq.
It appears that the United States and Russia may be close to some
form of an "Iraq-for-Georgia" deal. This likely means that Moscow
will not veto an American attack on Iraq in the U.N. Security Council
in exchange for U.S. acquiescence to a planned Russian operation in
Georgia. It also suggests that one of the last obstacles for a U.S.
war on Iraq is being removed and that Baghdad's fate soon will be
sealed.
No matter what happens, Washington will win. If an agreement is
reached, Moscow will deal with al Qaeda in the Caucasus but likely
will have to leave due to U.S. pressure. Even if there is no deal,
Washington likely will find another lever to make junior ally Putin
follow its lead on Iraq.
Putin's timing was perfect, as he made his ultimatum on the
anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, and his letter to the U.N.
Security Council Sept. 12 coincided with U.S. President George W.
Bush's speech to the General Assembly, in which he laid out the case
for an attack on Iraq.
This timing makes it difficult, especially for Washington, to accuse
Russia of aggression in also seeking to protect itself, as Moscow
claims, from terrorist threats. Moreover, Russia has more personal
reasons for striking inside Georgia than the U.S. does against Iraq:
Baghdad cannot hit American territory, while Islamic militants have
been attacking Russia from Georgian territory regularly for several
years.
The Deal in the Making
The possible U.S. turnaround comes a few weeks after White House
Press Secretary Ari Fleischer accused Moscow Aug. 25 of violating
Georgia's territorial integrity after it allegedly bombed the
Pankisi. But CBS news reported Sept. 5 -- based on information from
sources in the National Security Agency (NSA) -- that a few minutes
after the Sept. 11 attacks, a telephone call was intercepted from an
al Qaeda member in Afghanistan to an unknown person in Georgia, where
the attacks were praised and discussed.
The fact that the NSA has only now disclosed this information is an
indication that the Bush administration, despite the State Department
comments Sept. 13, is more supportive of Putin's case for Russian
counterterrorism operations in the Pankisi, especially since an
initially 1,000-man-strong Georgian military operation that began
there Aug. 25 has resulted in few militant arrests.
Bush called Putin Sept. 9, and it is possible that Iraq and Georgia
were key topics of discussion. Just two days later, Vershbow stated
that he hoped the United States and Russia would be on the same side
when it came to Iraq, adding that both "share common interests,"
Russian pro-government Web site Strana.ru reports. One of these
common interests appears to be helping each other in dealing with
their respective and, in some cases, common enemies.
In making the case that the United States and Russia face the same al
Qaeda-associated fighters, Vershbow stated Sept. 11, "We both have
been confronting terrorism that has an international dimension, and I
think we know that al Qaeda has been involved in supporting the
separatists in Chechnya," BBC reports. This acknowledgement comes a
few months after Washington admitted that al Qaeda elements were
present in the Pankisi, located across the border from Russia.
A possible Iraq-for-Georgia deal is likely to have been discussed in
detail at a meeting Sept. 12 between Vershbow and Vyasheslav
Trubnikov, a Russian deputy foreign minister responsible for
coordinating anti-terrorism activities with foreign countries.
Trubnikov is also a former head of Russia's Foreign Intelligence
Service.
Putin had to consult with Washington before making the ultimatum to
Georgia. On a strategic level, having committed himself and Russia to
a pro-Western course since Sept. 11, Putin understood the
repercussions that could result should he unilaterally threaten
Georgia.
On an operational level, Putin could not leave the U.S. government in
the dark about his move because of the presence in Georgia of
American military advisers, who were deployed to the country earlier
this year to train Georgian troops in counterterrorism tactics. The
last thing Putin wants is to get them caught in the middle of any
fighting.
Why Bush Needs the Deal
But much more important, Putin knows how much Washington needs
Russian support for its war against Iraq. Though the Bush
administration keeps saying it will act alone if need be, an Iraq
campaign would be much easier politically and strategically if backed
by the United Nations.
Russia's role in this regard cannot be overestimated. Of the five
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, only the United
States and Britain are united in their plans for Baghdad. France is
saying it will back the war if there is a U.N. resolution in support
of military action. China, not wanting to confront the United States,
is becoming more positive about agreeing to Washington's plans,
Reuters reported Sept. 13, but there is a chance it may decide to
avoid taking a position by abstaining from a vote.
So it falls to Russia to broker a U.N. resolution that will pave the
road to Baghdad for American troops. The United States has been
strongly pressuring Moscow on this issue for a long time. But Putin
has taken his time and figured out what to ask from his senior U.S.
ally in exchange for Iraq.
Why Putin Needs the Deal
Putin chose to pursue an "Iraq-for-Georgia" deal because it may help
him finally finish the second Chechen war, which started in 1999 when
Wahhabi militants from a de facto independent Chechnya invaded
Russia's Dagestan region. The Russian army launched a
counteroffensive, took Chechnya's capital Grozny after a bloody siege
and regained control over the province. However, Chechen and
international militants, including al Qaeda elements, have been
systematically inflicting serious losses on the Russian army in the
course of their guerrilla campaign.
Georgia's Pankisi and other regions adjacent to Chechnya have been
heavily used by these rebels as a base for logistics, regrouping and
recruiting, as well as a major financial route used for funneling
Middle Eastern money to the fighters. The militants, whose estimated
numbers have varied from several hundred to two thousand in the
Pankisi, often launched cross-border raids and attacks on the Russian
army and border guards.
The situation has become very similar to the one U.S. forces
experienced in Afghanistan. The U.S. troops also have had to sweep
for militants along Pakistan's side of the border, as the Pakistani
government is either unwilling or unable to stop cross-border attacks
on American troops.
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze has been even less willing or
able to deal with Islamic militants in Georgia than Pakistani
President Pervez Musharraf, leading Putin to press for a Russian
deployment in Georgia. Shevardnadze has refused for internal reasons -
- since he is extremely unpopular in Georgia and widely accused by
European media of corruption, he may be playing up a Russian threat
to distract the masses.
Rare Mistake by Georgian President
Shevardnadze bet on the U.S. support partly because Washington does
not want Moscow to gain a strong presence in the oil-rich Caucasus
region. But faced with a dilemma between gaining Russian support on
Iraq and sacrificing it, the Bush administration may find that these
two things are not compatible and might still opt to give Russia a
temporary free hand in Georgia if there is no other timely way to get
Russia's vote on Iraq.
Though the U.S. State Department said Sept. 13 it opposed Putin's
intentions to launch an operation against Islamic militants in
Georgia, Bush administration officials have remained silent on the
matter. Meanwhile, Kommersant, Vremya Novosti and many other Russian
and other former Soviet Union papers are speculating about an Iraq-
for-Georgia deal. Moscow has not made an official statement, but
several Russian government officials allege in the media that a deal
is being negotiated.
The fate of the deal depends on whether Washington thinks it can get
Russia on board for an Iraq attack without giving in on Georgia.
Given the pro-U.S. course Putin seems to be willingly pursuing, Bush
may decide that Moscow will not dare to veto a U.S. Security Council
war resolution in any instance.
But Washington also would like to see the al Qaeda presence in the
Caucasus destroyed. The U.S. advisers in Georgia likely have reported
that they cannot quickly train a sufficient number of Georgian units
to defeat al Qaeda-associated militants in the country. The Georgian
army currently lacks the motivation, weapons and training to fulfill
this difficult task. So in the end, Bush might agree to a Russian
operation, while cautioning that Russian troops must immediately
withdraw once they accomplish their goal.
It is not likely that this deal is a sure thing quite yet; Washington
and Moscow probably are still negotiating the details. Putin wants to
know how far he can proceed in Georgia: Cracking down on Islamists is
one thing, but going so far as replacing the anti-Russian
Shevardnadze is quite another. Putin also will try to launch an
operation in Georgia before Russia is required to vote on a U.N.
resolution, as he is afraid that after Moscow gives the green light,
Washington will withdraw its tacit support for Russia's actions.
Short-Term Benefits and Longer-Term Problems
Nevertheless, if the deal holds it likely will reap significant
benefits for both Washington and Moscow in the immediate future. For
the Bush administration it would mean that the last remaining
political obstacle to an Iraq war would be removed. In a war
sanctioned by the United Nations, Iraq's chances of getting political
and diplomatic support abroad would be diminished severely.
This in turn will further tilt the military and strategic balance in
the U.S. favor. Iraq will be dealt a huge blow when its traditional
top supporter Russia walks away, while Washington's efforts against
al Qaeda will be strengthened if the Russians can destroy an al Qaeda-
associated base in the Pankisi.
Putin likely would send Russian forces into Georgia this or next
month, before winter weather in the mountains makes air support
ineffective. Russia is more likely than Georgia to be able to clean
many of the Islamists out of the Pankisi faster and stay there to
block their attempts to return.
This could have a short-term positive effect on Russian operations in
Chechnya proper, since the militants will feel keenly the loss of the
logistic base in the Pankisi. And with a much stronger presence in
the country, Russia may be able to put enough pressure on
Shevardnadze's government to cause its downfall, which would help
Moscow to regain its former position in the Transcaucasus.
But looking farther ahead, the negative consequences of an Iraq-for-
Georgia deal may prove even greater, especially for Russia.
Washington will be able to overcome any minor temporary problems due
to sheer weight of its power and might, but Washington also will see
Russia's return to the Caucasus as a threat to its interests in the
oil-rich region.
The U.S. government will use its senior status in its relations with
Putin to limit Russia's advances to only the Pankisi Gorge.
Washington probably is already advising Shevardnadze to make a last-
minute attempt to avoid a Russian operation in Georgia by undertaking
real and meaningful measures against Islamic militants.
While seemingly concerned, Shevardnadze first responded to Putin's
ultimatum by simply saying he could not believe the Russian leader
would launch an operation into Georgia. The Georgian Security Council
was then quick to say that it has decided to "activate to the
maximum" its so-far-ineffective "anti-criminal" operations in the
Pankisi, Russian Web site lenta.ru reported Sept. 13.
But Georgian forces are not in a position to deal with highly skilled
Islamic militants. Moreover, many rebels reportedly have already left
the Pankisi and are located in other mountainous regions of Georgia.
So Georgian troops again will produce no results in the gorge,
strengthening Putin's argument and likely making an incursion
unavoidable.
But the benefits for Moscow will not last long. First, if the U.N.
Security Council adopts a war resolution on Iraq, Washington will
have little further incentive for supporting Russia's case in
Georgia. By that time Russian forces probably will have delivered a
blow to al Qaeda elements in Georgia, thus fulfilling the second U.S.
goal.
Washington then would apply pressure on Moscow to retreat beyond the
Caucasian Mountains again. Russia might resist, but it would have
little leverage due to the sharp imbalance in U.S. and Russian
capabilities.
Even once they deployed to the Pankisi, Russian troops likely would
find few militants there, as most would have fled by then. This would
force troops to sweep farther out in the countryside, causing more
resentment among Georgians already angry at Moscow for supporting the
secessionist campaign in the Abkhazia region.
Events might get out of control even if Washington told Moscow to
take its troops out. A civil war may begin between Shevardnadze and
pro-Russian groups, and new fighting could erupt between Georgians
and Abkhaz, provoked either by Shevardandze or by Abkhaz emboldened
by the Russian presence. The United States and Europe likely would
intervene politically in such a case and make Putin withdraw Russian
forces from Georgia. Russia would be blamed for creating chaos and
its relations with the West would suffer.
