Iraq:
Pentagon Plan the Last One Standing
But Invasion of Iraq not Imminent
Stratfor.com
28 June 2002
Summary
Retired Gen. Wayne Downing, a key figure in the debate over how
to fight Iraq, has resigned, leaving a clearer path for a
Pentagon proposal nicknamed "Desert Storm Lite." But even
without the opposition posed by Downing, the Pentagon's plan for
ousting Iraqi President Saddam Hussein may prove unworkable.
Analysis
Gen. Wayne Downing, who was brought out of retirement after
Sept. 11 to serve as a deputy national security adviser,
resigned suddenly from the anti-terrorism position on June 27.
Downing, who was a four-star Army general and the former chief
of Special Operations Command, departs only nine months after
taking the White House job.
Although his official duties focused on the al Qaeda threat,
Downing was one of the loudest voices in the debate over the
necessity and methods for destroying the regime of Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein. An unabashed hawk, Downing countered
the Pentagon's Iraq proposal, nicknamed "Desert Storm Lite,"
with an unconventional plan that relied on air power, special
operations forces and Iraqi defectors to oust Hussein. The
general's departure removes one of the last nodes of opposition
to the Pentagon's approach, but this does not necessarily mean
an acceleration in war-planning or preparations, or even a final
decision on a military strike.
Earlier this year, when war cries against Iraq were at a much
higher pitch, the Pentagon hatched a plan for a military
campaign against Baghdad that was very similar to that followed
during the Gulf War. A 200,000-strong force of armor, infantry
and aircraft would be assembled over two to three months,
presumably in Kuwait and Turkey, and unleashed against Iraq's
500,000 soldiers.
Both U.S. President George W. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld publicly blasted Pentagon planners for their lack of
creativity. However, between the lines the Pentagon was advising
caution -- suggesting that the White House should ease off its
strident anti-Hussein posture.
Downing played a key role in this debate. He had advised the
opposition Iraqi National Congress since 1998 and helped the
group refine a plan for overthrowing Hussein. That plan, drawn
up before Sept. 11, looked quite similar to the later U.S.
campaign against the Taliban: Special Operations troops would
advise and train local fighters, who would seize a deserted air
base in southern Iraq under U.S. air cover. Any Iraqi units
massed to attack the airfield would be destroyed from the air
while isolated units would be encouraged to defect.
Downing's plan had a few advocates, especially among civilian
staff in the Pentagon and White House. And his anti-terrorism
position gave him a soapbox from which to plug the issue.
The reasons behind Downing's departure are unclear. Media
reports suggest everything from frustration with the slow pace
of government to disenchantment with his inability to exercise
sole control over anti-terrorism efforts.
Whatever the reason, his departure means "Desert Storm Lite" is
essentially the sole remaining proposal for ousting Hussein --
but that doesn't mean an invasion of Iraq is imminent. From a
logistical perspective, executing the Pentagon's strategy would
require a substantial amount of planning and material
preparation, which would be made even more difficult by the
current dispersal of U.S. forces around the globe.
However, the strategy is complicated mainly by political
factors. Washington almost certainly wants the Middle East,
Afghanistan and Pakistan to calm down somewhat before it gets
involved in an entirely new crisis. Also, Arab states would need
to be in relative agreement with the U.S. plan.
The complexity of the Pentagon's plan actually may push back the
start of a campaign or cause it to be shelved indefinitely.