Army's chemical defenses not
battle-ready,
Army audit says
Up to 62% of gas masks and 90% of monitors
defective
Copyright 2002 Deseret News
By Lee Davidson
Deseret News Washington
correspondent
Sunday, October 13, 2002
WASHINGTON - Up to 62 percent of the U.S. Army's gas masks and up to 90
percent of the machines it uses to detect invisible chemical arms
attacks
may be defective.
Worse, the Army isn't really sure about the condition of most equipment
it would need to defend against chemical and
biological attacks just as America prepares for possible war with Iraq
over that country's development of such weapons.
That is the conclusion of an Army Audit Agency study obtained by the
Deseret News through the Freedom of Information Act. The report said the
military has ordered several steps be taken to help solve the problems
pointed
out in the audit.
Of Utah note, many of the military's gas masks, chemical agent
detectors and other protective and decontamination equipment were
developed or tested at Utah's Dugway Proving Ground, sometimes
with controversial open-air tests where dangerous agents floated off
base.
The audit agency, in a report dated last Nov. 9, wrote that its review
of procedures to ensure that chemical and biological defense equipment
is
in good repair showed that they "were fragmented and generally
ineffective."
It added, "As a result, Army leaders didn't know the true abilities of
units to survive and win in chemically or biologically contaminated
environments."
The agency said the trouble comes because only three of the 69
different types of Army chemical-biological defense equipment now used
in the
field have been deemed "mission essential." So unit commanders are
required
to file reports only on the condition of those few items and to keep
maintenance logs on them.
The agency said the condition of the other 66 types of items often was
not checked, nor was preventive maintenance kept current. When problems
were found, they often were not formally reported to high command so no
checks for similar problems elsewhere were conducted.
The report said that even though the 66 items may not have been
officially deemed mission critical, the agency said it figures they
obviously are
"crucial to survival in contaminated environments."
For example, it said, "Without fully operational chemical agent
monitors, deployed units in a chemically contaminated environment can't
be
certain of when the threat from contamination has diminished. Yet this
item wasn't deemed mission-essential."
Other items not officially considered mission critical included a
variety of protective masks, chemical agent alarms, decontamination
apparatuses and protective shelters.
Because the condition of such items was not routinely checked, some
widespread problems were found only by accident.
For example, when the Army obtained new chemical agent monitors for
high-priority units, they ordered their older monitors to be sent to
other units. But, "Army logistics personnel discovered that about 90
percent
of the existing chemical agent monitors . . . weren't fully operational
because of bad drift tubes."
The cost of repair was estimated at $7.8 million, but auditors said
problems could have been avoided if proper annual maintenance had
occurred on the machines.
Making the problem worse, investigators wrote, was that even though the
Army Materiel Command "knew that as many as 90 percent of units'
chemical
agent monitors were less than fully operational, they didn't formally
report
the problems to senior Army leadership.
"Accordingly, the related effect on readiness wasn't fully assessed and
corrective actions weren't fully implemented," the report said.
Auditors said that in hindsight, high demand for replacement drift
tubes earlier should have indicated a widespread problem, but the extent
was
not found until older monitors were ordered turned in on a large scale
and
tested. It noted that other types of monitors use similar tubes and
might also have problems.
Routine maintenance could have also prevented defects in gas masks, the
report said. A limited spot check a few years ago found that about 62
percent of Army gas masks "had critical defects that could have
resulted in mask leakage."
The report also noted that results of that check "weren't fully
distributed throughout the Army, (so) commanders generally didn't
increase the level of emphasis on mask maintenance and the status of the
majority of the Army's fielded masks remains unknown."
In short, the study said, "Up to 90 percent of the monitors and 62
percent of the masks were either completely broken or less than fully
operational."
It added, "The actual status, requirements, surpluses or shortfalls,
and true costs of Army efforts to defend against aggression through
chemical and biological weapons weren't known."
The audit agency recommended several changes. Written responses by the
Army and included with the study show that most corrective measures have
been approved by higher command.
Those steps include:
* Creating a program executive officer to oversee "from cradle to
grave" the condition and care of biological-chemical defense items.
That officer would establish an Armywide program for maintenance and
reporting and track results of readiness assessments.
* Taking another look at which of the equipment is "critical to
survivability in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment"
so a higher level of care would be given for truly essential items.
* Having higher command review what level of funding is truly needed
to maintain and support the equipment.
* Evaluating and issuing a report on the condition of the equipment,
especially monitors and protective equipment where problems had
surfaced.
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E-mail: leed@desnews.com
